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INTRODUCTION
Rising water scarcity in Texas sparked several
institutional changes supportive of water marketing in
the latter half of the 20th century. In two of these
situations judicial action introduced promarketing
changes where the Texas Legislature had been slow to
respond to evolving scarcity. Our objectives in this
paper are to provide an abridged discussion of these
changes and to observe the progress of Texas water
marketing to date.

4.

FOUR MAJOR WATER DOCTRINES
In and out of Texas, water policy commentators have
bemoaned the use of two separate policy doctrines for
ground and surface waters. The main complaint is that
optimal conjunctive use is frustrated by the use of two
conflicting doctrines, especially given the hydrologic
relationships that bind ground and surface water. Texas,
however, employs four doctrines. The applicable
doctrine depends on the water body:
1.

2.

3.

fractured limestone character and its strong linkages
to surface water flows, the supply of water from the
Edwards is highly stochastic, much like a river. The
primary policy to be employed for assigning
drought shortages is not yet defined.
Rest-of-Texas ground water is allocated in
accordance with the absolute ownership doctrine
(sometimes referred to as the “rule of capture”), a
common property arrangement that borders on
being an open access institution. All landowners
overlying an aquifer are entitled to pump as much
water as they see fit, untethered by any
“reasonability” criterion as would be practiced in
most other states.

As a consequence of the multiple policies practiced for
different water bodies, Texas has some broad experience
with the emergence of water markets and related
institutions. The following four sections observe some
of the particular experiences forthcoming from each of
these situations.
After discussing the individual
circumstances of each of these four settings, some
crosscutting observations for the State will be
presented.

A style of correlative water rights is used in a large
segment of the Rio Grande River basin. Water
rights are transferable and are severed from land
rights, but they do not have dated seniorities. The
impacts of dry-period shortages fall almost entirely
on irrigators, as municipal water supplies are
protected under the current allocation procedure.
Rest-of-Texas surface water is managed by the prior
appropriations doctrine. Rights are severed from
land and are transferable. The shortage hierarchy
depends on the seniority of the right rather than the
type of use.
The Edwards Aquifer, which serves the San
Antonio region, has been undergoing adjudication
pumping rights are being quantified and assigned.
This course of action was selected by the State, so
that Texas could comply with federal judicial
pressure stemming from Endangered Species Act
enforcement. Once completed, water rights will be
transferable independent of land. Because of its

RIO GRANDE RIVER BASIN
The Rio Grande flows from southern Colorado to the
Gulf of Mexico, but periods of the year find little or no
water in the riverbed between El Paso and the point
where tributary inflow from the Rio Conchos enters from
Mexico. For the purposes of water rights administration,
the Rio Grande is defined as that portion of the river
flowing south out of Amistad Reservoir and on to the
Gulf of Mexico. This region, commonly referred to as the
Rio Grande Valley, is highly dependent on surface water.
The severe drought of the 1950s led to an extended legal
battle over Rio Grande water that was settled in 1971
with a state court adjudicating regional water rights.
Rights entitle users to a portion of the combined storage
of Amistad and Falcon reservoirs, the volumes of which
are apportioned by treaty between the United States
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(U.S.) and Mexico. Administering water right accounts
and transfers on the U.S. side of the basin is the
responsibility of the Rio Grande Watermaster’s office.
The vast majority (~99 percent) of rights are designated
for use in either municipal or irrigation activities. Urban
uses have a higher priority and make up approximately
15 percent of annual water use.

little fluctuation in the lease price of municipal water.
During the period 1994 to 1999, the weighted average of
municipal lease price increased from $20 to $30 per acrefoot during dry years. The agricultural sector, however,
is forced to absorb the majority of any annual shortfall in
supply, and therefore sees a much greater increase in
price during periods of drought. Over the same period,
weighted average prices for irrigation leases were $10 $15 per acre-foot in normal years, but rose as high as $60
per acre-foot during dry years.

The monthly process of allocating new reservoir inflows
among right holders employs an accounting device
referred to as the “municipal reserve,” which is
recharged before prorating remaining inflows to
irrigators (Characklis, Griffin, & Bedient 1999). The
current size of this reserve is 225,000 acre-feet, and it
does not decline during the year, regardless of the
amount of water used by municipalities. The size of the
municipal reserve is updated periodically to keep pace
with the continuing transfer of water from agricultural to
urban use. The last update took place in 1986. Since
that time, the number of municipal rights has grown to
approximately 320,000 acre-feet, giving rise to
discussions over whether the size of the municipal
allocation should be increased.

REST-OF-TEXAS SURFACE WATER
In stark contrast to the extensive and everyday water
marketing that occurs in the Rio Grande valley, surface
water marketing is uncommon in the remainder of the
State. Interestingly, the few trades that do occur are
often well-trumpeted exchanges of large blocks of water.
Texas surface water policy is overtly supportive of water
reallocation by water marketing, so it may seem unusual
that exchanges are so infrequent. The Texas Water
Development Board has even established the Texas
Water Bank, essentially a clearinghouse whereby buyers
and sellers can find one another, but it is quite idle.

Water rights within the region can be bought, sold, or
leased. Transfer procedures are relatively unrestrictive
as a result of both a well-conceived regulatory
framework and some region-specific characteristics
(such as a lack of concern over third party impacts or
instream flow requirements). The relative simplicity of
the transfer process, in conjunction with rapid regional
development, has resulted in one of the most active
water markets in the country. Movement of water rights
has been almost exclusively from agricultural to urban
use, with municipalities acquiring on the order of 10,000
acre-feet of additional rights per year. While cities
continue to acquire rights, they do so primarily in
anticipation of future growth and consistently use only
about 65 percent of the water to which they are entitled.
Prices for water rights are ranging from $1,200 to $1,400
per acre-foot, with rumors of offers as high as $1,700.
Temporary transfers, generally in the form of one-year
leases (or “contract” water in local parlance), account for
a great deal of market activity with 20,000 to 80,000 acrefeet changing hands annually.

Four reasons go far in explaining the dearth of
transactions away from the Rio Grande. First, water
scarcity is generally not an issue in Texas's eastern
basins during average and wet years. Water marketing
does not offer rewards in these places and times.
Second, Texas does not possess natural conduits or a
federally subsidized “California” infrastructure for
wheeling water about the state.
Without such
conveyance mechanisms, and it is unlikely that such
projects could pass a cost-benefit test, an active market
bridging water-rich and water-short basins cannot
develop.
Third, water right enforcement is spotty except for the
Rio Grande River. Whereas in the Rio Grande operating
basin the Watermaster’s office employs a strong system
of constant monitoring and water accounting, elsewhere
in the State enforcement is very light and is generally
limited to exceptionally dry periods. The problem faced
here is double-edged. People don't feel the need to buy
things that they can take for free, and they are unlikely
to buy something that can be easily taken from them.

It is important to note that while sales of rights between
municipalities and irrigators are allowed, the priority
disparity between municipal and irrigation rights results
in a prohibition on leasing between the two sectors.
This separation has allowed for some interesting price
observations as climatic conditions in the region have
varied. Municipal users, whose water supply is secure
under all but the most extreme drought conditions, see

The fourth reason for thin water markets in the rest of
the state is the presence of river authorities. In some,
yet not all, of Texas’s 18 separate river basins, one or
more river authorities have been established to serve all
or part of the basin. River authorities generally own
some water rights, operate some major reservoirs, and
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enter into water delivery contracts to provide raw or
finished water to cities, industries, or water districts. As
nonprofit, self-supporting entities, these authorities
have generally channelled their excess water or
electricity revenues, as well as their borrowing abilities,
into extending their domains within their licensed service
areas. That is, they have steadily purchased the
facilities and associated water rights of lesser public and
private water districts. The resulting monopolistic
power makes open water marketing infeasible and moves
water reallocation to the internal workings of these river
authorities. It is noteworthy that no river authority
exists in the Rio Grande basin.

construct a surface water reservoir on Ranch property.
The agreement calls for the Pierce Ranch to receive 20
percent of future revenues from the sales of ground
water or surface water storage. If developed, ground
water resources and reservoir storage are estimated to
bring LCRA another 50,000 acre-feet of firm yield.
EDWARDS AQUIFER
Federal court rulings forced 1993 and 1995 legislation
that abandoned use of Texas’s archaic absolute
ownership doctrine in the Edwards Aquifer (currently
San Antonio’s sole source of water). The Edwards acts
as a natural interbasin transfer project, and the
springflows it produces support several endangered
species. Unabated pumping during dry times threatened
those springflows and species, so new policy was
adopted in the face of considerable inertia and friction.
Although adjudication procedures commenced during
1996, it will take a few more years before ground water
rights will be assigned. Once permit assignments are
finalized, each permittee will be entitled to a specified
quantity of annual pumpage. Water rights within the
region will be administered by the Edwards Aquifer
Authority (EAA). Total permits issued will be in excess
of the legislatively mandated 450,000 ac-ft per year, so
the EAA will work to trim the excess, probably relying
on the market mechanism (purchase, then retire permits).
In 2007, total pumpage will be cut further to 400,000 acft/year, although the mechanism for doing so is unclear.

For the above reasons, the traditional market ideal of
atomistic agents engaging in regular trading has not
emerged, except in the Rio Grande region. This is not to
say that no transfers have occurred. For example, large
blocks of water have been conveyed as part of three
significant transactions during recent years.
In 1997, the City of Corpus Christi agreed to terms with
the Garwood Irrigation Company (a privately held
supplier of irrigation water) regarding the transfer of
35,000 acre-feet, leaving Garwood with 133,000 acre-feet.
This transaction represented an interbasin transfer for
which no conveyance facilities existed. A subsequent
contract between Corpus Christi and the LavacaNavidad River Authority (LNRA) involved an additional
41,840 acre-feet annually, but the actual water rights
remain under the authority’s ownership. Corpus Christi
then constructed a 100-mile pipeline from the city to the
LNRAs Lake Texana, which is located between Corpus
Christi and Garwood’s point of diversion. Eventually, a
second pipeline can allow the Garwood water to be
transported to Lake Texana and on to Corpus Christi.

At present there are no seniorities designed into
Edwards rights, a fact that promises to be troubling
because Edwards flows can vary greatly from year to
year (historically ranging from 40,000 – 2 million acrefeet). The EAA has several available options. It can
treat assigned rights as correlative shares and announce
proportional cutbacks for all right holders during
droughts. Alternatively, EAA’s enabling statute directs
it to label certain uses as “discretionary” and subject to
temporary cancellation during droughts. It is also
authorized to buy up existing rights as a means to limit
pumping, but this mechanism seems better attuned to
accomplishing long-term goals.

In 1998, the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA)
bought Garwood Irrigation Company for $75 million,
thereby acquiring its facilities and remaining water
rights. Conversion of this 133,000 acre-feet of “run-ofthe-river” water (dependent on available flow) to firm
yield provided LCRA with 101,000 acre-feet. LCRA
continues to serve Garwood's clients (mostly rice
producers), but it will progressively reallocate this water
to growing demand in the Austin area.

Water marketing of various types (including both sales
and leasing) is occurring prior to the completion of the
adjudication process. The city of San Antonio, which is
almost entirely dependent on Edwards water for its
municipal supply, has been the primary buyer. Transfers
from irrigators to municipalities are subject to some
restrictions, however, as current EAA rules state that
only 50 percent of an irrigator’s adjudicated volume can
be sold for urban use. Land sales of irrigated properties

In 2000, LCRA completed a multipart deal with the Pierce
Ranch, another significant holder of Colorado River
water rights. The exchange involved a $17 million dollar
payment for roughly 18,000 acre-feet of senior surface
water rights, as well as a 50-year option for the
development of ground water on the ranch. Also, part
of the deal is a 50-year option allowing the LCRA to
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have been spurred by the prospects of valuable ground
water rights. While the Edwards market is lacking in
transparency, with few means of price discovery, recent
deals imply water rights (subject to final adjudication
and thus somewhat speculative) are selling in the range
of $750 to 800 per ac-ft, with one-year leases going for
around $75. Cities have also funded annual fallowing
programs designed to provide irrigators with an
incentive not to irrigate.

While ground water ranching and water contracts
between landowners and water purveyors have been
conducted for decades, increasing levels of water
scarcity and, perhaps, some speculative tendencies are
creating larger scaled ventures. A recent example
involves the sale of approximately 70,000 ac-ft of
groundwater rights by landowners in Roberts County to
the city of Amarillo. Despite the 70-mile distance and a
contractual agreement that the water not be withdrawn
for at least 25 years, Amarillo paid ranchers $275 per acft for the rights (Gilliland, 2000). Another example
involves San Antonio’s continual quest to supplement
its Edwards water source. San Antonio has entered into
contractual negotiations with Alcoa Corporation for the
rights to purchase ground water originating from a
lignite mining operation in the Carrizo-Wilcox aquifer
over 100 miles from the city. In another instance, San
Antonio and several other cities, have had some
preliminary, but well publicized, discussions with a
group of landowners in the Texas panhandle regarding
groundwater sales and conveyance. While the cost of
transporting water 650 miles to San Antonio probably
renders this project economically inefficient, the
attention received by the proposal is noteworthy.

This is an active and unsettled marketplace. Participants
are learning by doing. Until the aquifer is fully and
finally adjudicated and until transfer and drought rules
are resolved, substantial uncertainty will exist regarding
the eventual prices and performance of the Edwards
water market.
REST-OF-TEXAS GROUND WATER
The spirit of the absolute ownership doctrine is that
ground water access is an original privilege of land
ownership. Although this privilege can be separately
transferred, much like mineral rights, this right does not
attach either constraint or protection regarding the
amount of ground water that may be pumped. Recent
years have seen the emergence of many Texas ground
water districts, which have the stated intent of fostering
more conservative ground water use. While the rules of
many of these districts have initiated some modest
restraints on pumping, many districts have also put in
place rules designed to discourage exportation of water
(e.g., pumping limitations, export fees, and/or taxes).
State policy places no restrictions on the transfer of
ground water across basins. This has led to a
heightened concern within the agricultural community
that local ground water is vulnerable to acquisition by
covetous municipalities. This places irrigators in the
somewhat paradoxical position of wanting to limit their
private property rights in an effort to protect those
rights. Symptomatic of this balancing act, districtadopted deviations from the fundamental tenants of
absolute ownership have often been minor, while still
attempting to limit the threat of exportation.

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
It has been interesting, and occasionally entertaining, to
observe Texas progress in coping with increasing water
scarcity. Public rhetoric still emphasizes our alleged
water “needs” (rather than scarcity-sensitive demand)
and the supposed gravity of water for achieving
economic growth. Legislators and other leaders are still
prone to think of and speak of “water requirements,”
thereby missing and underutilizing demand management
tools, especially water pricing. Given these attitudes,
were it not for the generally positive contributions of
water marketing, it would be easy for Texas leaders to
embark on a multitude of expensive water supply and
conveyance projects. It is very doubtful that any such
project could offer a positive net present value, but
Texas law does not require that state projects pass a
cost-benefit test. Water markets have done a wonderful
service by allaying some of the demand for these public
projects.

Further complicating the issue of ground water
marketing is the nature of ground water district
boundaries, which are generally political rather than
hydrologic. Many ground water districts currently
cover only a fraction of the total surface area overlaying
an aquifer because most are one-county districts. It
remains to be seen how ground water transfers within
such an aquifer, but across districts, will be complicated
by these political boundaries.

On the other hand, the infrequency and huge scale of
surface water transactions away from the Rio Grande
raises serious questions about actual efficiency of these
markets. It appears that rest-of-Texas surface water is
being exchanged in a marketplace tainted by market
power, noneconomic strategic behavior, and lax water
right enforcement.
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In their efforts “to make a difference” and respond to
voters, legislators have been inclined to tinker with our
water law in ways that do not necessarily improve water
rights or enhance economic efficiency. These acts can
be unsettling for water markets, because the powers
embedded in water rights can be suddenly changed. For
example, 1997s Senate Bill 1 granted surface water right
holders substantial discretion to reuse their return flow,
to the detriment of other users who depend on this
return flow. This unusual redefinition of surface water
rights acted to shift water rights from junior right holders
to senior ones, from downstream right holders to
upstream ones, and from instream uses to diversionary
ones. The same Act also established some new hurdles
for interbasin transfers of rights. The most interesting
change was that a successful interbasin transfer of a
water right would immediately become junior to all other
existing water rights in the originating basin. Clearly, it
is tough for a water market to perform social service if
the rules are always in flux.

opportunity costs such as marginal user costs, marginal
capacity costs, and the marginal value of raw water
(Griffin, 2000). Since these errors affect both sides of a
water market, case studies are needed to examine the
direction of water market biases.
Lastly, the current state of Texas water market
institutions appears to be underserving public good
uses of water. That is, the general bias of present
policies is to provide water for diversionary human
purposes (agriculture, commerce, municipal, industry) as
opposed to natural and recreational in situ uses such as
instream and estuarine demands.
Natural aquatic
systems have generally become stressed in Texas as a
consequence of overappropriated surface waters.
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